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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

Kari Lake and Mark Finchem,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Kathleen Hobbs, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-00677-JJT

**MARICOPA COUNTY DEFENDANTS'
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES**

(Honorable John J. Tuchi)

1 Defendants Bill Gates, Clint Hickman, Jack Sellers, Thomas Galvin, and Steve
 2 Gallardo in their official capacities as members of the Maricopa County Board of
 3 Supervisors (“the County”) hereby file their reply in support of their application for
 4 attorneys’ fees (the “Application”). Plaintiffs’ Response (the “Response”) (Doc. 110) fails
 5 to set forth any basis for a reduction of the fees requested by Defendants. Plaintiffs’ counsel
 6 concedes that the rates charged by Defendants’ counsel are reasonable and makes no
 7 assertion that the overall amount requested is unreasonable¹. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ counsel
 8 makes no effort to address the Local Rule 54.2 factors expressly addressed in the
 9 Application, instead erroneously asserting that, “[t]here is no explanation concerning how
 10 the amount of time spent was reasonable.” [Response at 11 n.5]. Finally, there is no basis
 11 for Plaintiffs’ counsels’ erroneous assertions that Defendants’ counsels’ billing practices
 12 warrant a reduction in fees.

13 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

14 **I. THE COUNTY’S FEE REQUEST IS REASONABLE.**

15 As an initial matter, it should be noted that, but for one case, none of the cases cited
 16 in the Response address attorneys’ fee awards in the context of sanctions for violations of
 17 Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In fact, Plaintiffs’ counsel completely ignores the court’s
 18 significantly higher attorneys’ fee awards in *King v. Whitmer*, 2021 WL 5711102 (E.D.
 19 Michigan, December 2, 2021) and *O’Rourke v. Dominion Voting Systems, Inc.*, 571
 20 F.Supp.3d 1190 (D. Colorado Nov. 22, 2021). Two cases in which attorneys’ fee awards
 21 were granted in election-related litigation where Plaintiffs’ counsel similarly failed to
 22 “conduct a reasonable inquiry into whether the factual allegations had evidentiary

23
 24 ¹ As was set forth in the affidavits submitted by the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office
 25 (“MCAO”) attorneys, their time is generally tracked for internal budgeting purposes. As
 26 such, time for “clerical-related” activities are sometimes billed. Defendants take no position
 27 on whether these entries are appropriate for inclusion in an award of attorneys’ fees under
 28 the circumstances of this matter. Defendants’ counsel also does not contest that the 5.3
 hours billed by Mr. La Rue on May 12, 2022, for a phone call was a typographical error and
 fees for only 0.5 hours at Mr. La Rue’s rate of \$300 per hour were incurred for that phone
 call. Likewise, Ms. Hartman-Tellez’s one hour mathematical error should be excluded from
 Defendant’s request. Accordingly, Defendants have reduced their fee request by \$1740.00.

1 support.” *Id.* at 1208.

2 Moreover, while Defendants agree the Court must use the “lodestar” method in
 3 calculating the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award, using that method further
 4 supports the award requested. *See Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., Inc.*, 224 F.3d 1014,
 5 1028 (9th Cir.2000); *Morales v. City of San Rafael*, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir.1996). “The
 6 ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably
 7 expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” *Id.* The Response makes no claim,
 8 because it cannot, that the total amount of hours expended was unreasonable under the
 9 circumstances of this case. Indeed, as set forth in the Application, the amount requested
 10 represents the reasonable fees incurred by the County in connection with: (1) fully briefing
 11 its Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) and all related meet and confer obligations; (2) fully
 12 briefing its opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“MPI”); (3)
 13 preparing for and appearing at the July 21, 2022, all day hearing in this matter, including
 14 preparing for and presenting witnesses and arguing both the County’s MTD and
 15 Opposition to MPI; (4) fully briefing matters as requested by the Court following the
 16 hearing; and (5) fully briefing its Motion for Sanctions, including all meet and confer
 17 obligations.

18 Because of the expedited nature of this matter, multiple attorneys were required to
 19 adequately represent the interests of the County. Of note, Plaintiffs were represented by a
 20 total of five attorneys; the County similarly staffed this case, yet it only requested fees for
 21 four of its attorneys and did not seek fees that are duplicative. The requested amount is
 22 reasonable and appropriate and Plaintiffs offer no legal or factual basis for finding to the
 23 contrary.

24 **A. Defendants’ counsel did not improperly block bill their time for unrelated
 25 tasks.**

26 The Response primarily asserts that the requested fee award should be reduced
 27 because Defendants’ counsel improperly blocked billed time to unrelated tasks. Plaintiffs’
 28 assertions are inaccurate. This case was litigated, almost entirely, within a three and a half

1 month period of time on an expedited track. Given this compressed timeframe, to the extent
 2 some time entries were provided in blocks, those blocks of time were for related tasks.
 3 There simply was no time to “multi-task” in this matter. The May 18, 2022, time entry by
 4 Ms. Craiger that is highlighted by Plaintiff’s counsel in the Response at p. 6, clearly shows
 5 her billing that day for researching and drafting the Rule 11 and Motion to Dismiss letter
 6 sent to Plaintiff’s counsel the following day. The billing entry in *Banas v. Volcano Corp.*,
 7 47 F. Supp. 3d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2014) despite Plaintiffs’ erroneous assertion, is in no way
 8 comparable. That billing entry shows time for preparing for a motion for summary
 9 judgment hearing, preparing for trial, responding to a motion for sanctions and budgeting,
 10 among other things. *Id.* at 967.

11 Moreover, the *Banas* case involved an entirely different basis for a fee award
 12 and an extraordinarily high fee request. Specifically, in *Banas*, the court awarded
 13 attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in a contract dispute pursuant to an attorneys’ fees
 14 provision in the merger agreement at issue. *Id.* at 961. And, the prevailing party in that
 15 matter sought a fee award of \$3,557,034.50. *Id.* There is no comparison between the *Banas*
 16 matter and the instant action.

17 Finally, courts exclude block billed time under the lodestar method to the extent
 18 it cannot determine whether “the compensation sought is for hours reasonably related to
 19 the litigation of successful claims and claims closely related to successful claims.” *Frank*
 20 *Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.*, 886 F.2d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir.1989). A
 21 party’s “failure to specify the subject of work performed results in the exclusion from the
 22 lodestar calculation of any time spent in tasks whose relatedness to such claims cannot be
 23 determined from the supporting time entries”. *Frevach v. Multnomah County*, No. CV–
 24 99–1295–HU, 2001 WL 34039133, at *13–14, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22255, at *45
 25 (D.Or. Dec. 18, 2001). Here, the Court awarded Defendants all fees incurred from the
 26 filing of the First Amended Complaint until it granted Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions.

27 **B. Defendants appropriately excluded excessive, duplicative time entries.**

28 As addressed above, given the nature of the case and the expedited timeframe,

1 Defendants appropriately staffed this matter. Plaintiffs' FAC (Doc. 3) was nearly 55 pages,
 2 their MPI (Doc. 50) was nearly 38 pages, and both included thousands of pages of exhibits.
 3 Researching, moving for dismissal, responding to the MPI and preparing for the hearing
 4 in this matter required an experienced team that had to work together quickly. The five
 5 hours of total time billed for strategy sessions and phone calls between the attorneys,
 6 identified in the Response at p. 10, is by no means excessive.

7 Further, Plaintiffs' reliance on *Lemus v. Timberland Apartments, LLC*, 876 F Supp.
 8 2d 1169, 1179 (D.Or. 2012) for the assertion that more than two attorneys billing for a
 9 hearing is presumptively unreasonable is, once again, misplaced. At issue in that case was
 10 whether a second attorney's time, who made only a few remarks at oral argument on a
 11 motion for summary judgment, was appropriately included in the fee application. Notably,
 12 the court found that it was, stating, "it was reasonable for two attorneys to appear on behalf
 13 of a single client for oral argument on several motions." *Id.* But here the time billed was
 14 for appearance at an all-day evidentiary hearing on the MPI for which the parties had only
 15 ten days to prepare. Given the demands of preparing for and appearing at such a hearing,
 16 the staffing of four attorneys is entirely reasonable and, as noted above, comparable to the
 17 staffing by Plaintiffs' counsel.

18 **C. Defendants' counsels' time for drafting its various pleadings is reasonable.**

19 Plaintiffs contend that despite Defendants' counsels' expertise in election law, they
 20 spent excessive time researching and drafting pleadings. As an initial matter, as the Court
 21 is aware, the claims and relief requested in this matter were unprecedented. Defending
 22 against these difficult constitutional and statutory questions concerning election
 23 administration, as well as determining the profoundly detrimental impact that the relief
 24 sought would have on the voters of Arizona was a time consuming endeavor. Those
 25 questions were unnecessarily made more complicated because many were supported by
 26 factual allegations that had little to no basis in reality and were not relevant to elections in
 27 Arizona. Defendants not only had to respond to those legal questions, but they also had to
 28 explain the true state of affairs regarding elections in Arizona and Maricopa County in

1 order to demonstrate the lawfulness, integrity, and trustworthiness of the County’s election
 2 equipment and processes because of the numerous false and misleading assertions made
 3 by Plaintiffs’ counsel. The difficulty was exacerbated by the compressed time-period of
 4 just three and a half months during which this litigation, from start to finish, occurred.

5 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ assertion that this time is “excessive” without further
 6 specification is insufficient. *See In re Indenture of Tr. Dated January 13, 1964*, 235 Ariz.
 7 40, 52–53, ¶ 47 (App. 2014) (“A party challenging the amount of fees requested must
 8 provide specific references to the record and specify which amount or items are
 9 excessive.”); *Id.*, quoting *State v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y*, 578 F.Supp. 1262, 1264 (D.
 10 Ariz. 1984) (“[A]n opposing party does not meet his burden merely by asserting broad
 11 challenges to the application. It is not enough ... simply to state, for example, that the hours
 12 claimed are excessive...”); *see also* Ariz. Dist. Ct. Local Rule 54.2(f), (requiring party
 13 opposing request for attorneys’ fees and related non-taxable expenses to “separately
 14 identify each and every disputed time entry or expense item”).

15 Finally, Plaintiff’s assertion, in the Response at p. 12, that Defendants’ counsel
 16 spending slightly more than 13 hours drafting the Motion for Sanctions, that was granted,
 17 is excessive because Rule 11 had already been researched is, on its face, absurd. Although
 18 all counsel for Defendants are seasoned election law attorneys and litigators, none have
 19 ever, in their decades long careers, filed for sanctions under Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
 20 Further, the process for filing under Rule 11 requires several technical steps with discrete
 21 timelines, all of which, it is undisputed, Defendants followed. As such, the research
 22 concerning this process is not, as Plaintiffs assert, “compensation for general education”,
 23 even if the bankruptcy matters on which the Plaintiffs rely for this proposition were
 24 applicable. *See, Wepsic v. Josephson (In re Wepsic)*, 238 B.R. 845, 848 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
 25 1999) (*citing In re Maruko*, 160 B.R. 633 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993)). Further, the sanctions
 26 motion required combing through the hundreds and hundreds of pages of irrelevant and
 27 misleading documents filed by Plaintiffs in order to paint a clear picture for the Court.

II. CONCLUSION

2 The County respectfully asks the Court to award attorneys' fees totaling \$139,950,
3 which is the amount the County originally requested [see Doc. 107], less the amount
4 identified in footnote 1 as incorrectly billed, *supra*.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of January, 2023.

THE BURGESS LAW GROUP

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 5, 2023, I electronically transmitted the foregoing document to the U.S. District Court Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and for transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to all CM/ECF registrants.